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European Central Bank Working Paper Series  63Abstract
The objective of this paper is to examine the main features of optimal monetary policy
within a micro-founded macroeconometric framework. First, using Bayesian techniques,
we estimate a medium scale closed economy DSGE for the euro area. Then, we study the
properties of the Ramsey allocation through impulse response, variance decomposition and
counterfactual analysis. In particular, we show that, controlling for the zero lower bound
constraint, does not seem to limit the stabilization properties of optimal monetary policy.
the Ramsey allocation reasonably well. Such optimal simple operational rules seem to react
speciﬁcally to nominal wage inﬂation. Overall, the Ramsey policy together with its simple
rule approximations seem to deliver consistent policy messages and may constitute some
useful normative benchmarks within medium to large scale estimated DSGE framework.
prove the economic micro-foundation and the econometric identiﬁcation of the structural
disturbances.
Keywords: DSGE models, Monetary policy, Bayesian estimation, Welfare calculations.
JEL classiﬁcation: E4, E5.
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We also present simple monetary policy rules which can “approximate” and implement
However, this normative analysis based on estimated models reinforces the need to im-Non-Technical Summary
The objective of this paper is to examine the main features of optimal monetary policy
within an empirically plausible micro-founded macroeconometric framework for the euro area.
This paper contributes to the burgeoning literature related to the theory of monetary stabiliza-
tion policy which investigates the design of optimal monetary policy and consider how such
policy can be implemented.
The closed-economy medium-scale model we use and estimate is similar to the one of by
Smets and Wouters [2003] which accounts relatively well for euro area business cycles. Aside
various real and nominal frictions, the theoretical framework features eight structural distur-
bances driving economic ﬂuctuations.
The computation of the optimal policy is obtained by solving the equilibrium conditions
of the Ramsey allocation and using second-order approximations to the policy functions. The
most closely related paper to our study is Levin et al. [2005] which examined such optimal allo-
cation within an estimated DSGE on the US data and explored its implementation with simple
rules. We share more speciﬁcally the inclusion in the normative analysis of a full set of distur-
bance processes. Such feature is of importance in our analysis since welfare computations and
optimal simple rules that we provide in this paper, crucially depend on the structure of shocks
and therefore should be computed with the appropriate exogenous sources of business cycles
ﬂuctuations. On this point we differ from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2005] and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe [2004] which only take into account three shocks.
The original contributions of our paper cover several dimensions. First, we make a special
effort to illustrate the empirical properties of the Ramsey allocation for the euro area. Among
the properties of the optimal monetary policy, we focus in particular on the driving factors of
the Ramsey allocation dynamics compared with the one derived from using the estimated in-
terest rate rule. A second novelty of our paper is that, unlike Levin et al. [2005], we incorporate
the zero lower bound constraint into the analysis. We try to draw conclusions on the likelihood
of occurrence of this constraint and more interestingly, on its normative implications. Our re-
sults indicate that contrary to what is shown in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2005], the Ramsey
policy is not operational in the sense that it induces a high probability to tilt the zero bound.
5
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stabilization properties of optimal monetary policy are preserved. Third, the paper highlights
the need to improve the economic micro-foundation and the econometric identiﬁcation of the
structural disturbances when bringing together estimated models and optimal policy analysis.
In particular, a better understanding of the labor market sources of ﬂuctuation is required. Fi-
bust optimal rule in the sense of Giannoni and Woodford [2003a] which exactly replicates the
Ramsey allocation in a simpliﬁed model with price and wage stickiness. Such exercises indi-
cate that simple rules can indeed approximate relatively well the Ramsey allocation but are
crucially sensitive to the structure of economic disturbances.
6
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We show in particular that the optimal rule derived can present some similarities with the ro-
nally, we explore the derivation of optimal simple rules to implement the optimal allocation.1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to examine the main features of optimal monetary policy within
an empirically plausible micro-founded macroeconometric framework for the euro area. This
paper contributes to the burgeoning literature related to the theory of monetary stabilization
policy which investigates the design of optimal monetary policy and consider how such policy
can be implemented.
The closed-economy medium-scale model we use is similar to the one estimated by Smets
and Wouters [2003] which accounts relatively well for euro area business cycles. Aside vari-
ous real and nominal frictions, the theoretical framework features eight structural disturbances
driving economic ﬂuctuations. Three efﬁcient supply shocks are associated with technological
progress, investment speciﬁc productivity and labor supply. Consumer preference and public
expenditure disturbances constitute two efﬁcient demand shocks. Time-varying labor income
and ﬁrm revenue taxes generate price and wage markup shocks. Finally, we introduce an ad-
ditional markup ﬂuctuation related to the external ﬁnance premium.
The typology of the structural disturbances embodied in the model is ﬁrst guided by our
objective to bring the theoretical model to the data but also reﬂects the need to analyze the
optimal response to both efﬁcient and inefﬁcient, product and labor market shocks. In partic-
ular, the estimated residuals obtained from the econometric estimation of the ﬁrst-order DSGE
approximation will be used as structural sources of uncertainty to assess the stabilization prop-
erties of optimal policy. The limitations of such approach are twofold. In order to ﬁt a relevant
number of data, the range of shocks generally considered in the theoretical literature has to be
extended, sometimes in directions which obviously lack sound micro-foundations. At the same
time, alternative micro-foundation of disturbances can lead to observationally equivalent ﬁrst-
order DSGE approximation. In that case, the estimation strategy will not be able to identify
in a decisive manner some source of ﬂuctuations which can have crucially different normative
properties. In this paper, we intend to illustrate those points by fully deriving the normative
implications of the ﬁrst-order estimation of the model.
Concerning the computation of the optimal policy, we solve the equilibrium conditions of
7
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ical strategy is based on perturbation methods and is well-suited for our modeling framework,
given the large number of state variables. This general method to derive the second-order
approximation of the Ramsey solution allow us in principle to depart from some widespread
restrictions used in the literature to rely on undistorted non-stochastic steady state. In addition,
contrarytothelinear-quadraticapproachofBenignoandWoodford[2006]whichapproximates
the Ramsey problem by a linear quadratic one, the second-order approximation of the Ramsey
allocation performed in this paper allows to depart from certainty equivalence and analyze the
effect of policies on the ﬁrst moment of the state variables. In the paper, since we intend to
focus on the macroeconomic stabilization properties of the Ramsey policy in a medium-scale
modeling framework, the constraint of efﬁcient steady state is imposed toex ante avoid creating
additional policy tradeoffs due to the inefﬁcient steady state. In doing so we want to concen-
trate on the implications of the already rich structure of frictions and shocks on optimal policy.
The issue of implementing the Ramsey policy with an interest rate rule is addressed in the
following way. First, a fully-ﬂedged derivation of the robust interest rate rule in the sense of
Giannoni and Woodford [2003a] is beyond the scope of this paper and would probably prove
difﬁcult to interpret given the number of state variable likely to enter the target criteria. Sec-
ond, we restrict our attention to interest-rate rules which satisfy the following requirements.
The interest rate is set as a function of a limited number of economic variables and concepts.
We allow the model output gap to enter the feedback rule since its volatility has a strong im-
pact on the welfare, and it remains a relevant economic concept for the stylized policy analysis
pursued in this paper. In addition, the policy rule should induce a determinate equilibrium
which satisﬁes the lower bound on nominal interest rate.
The most closely related paper to our study is Levin et al. [2005] which examined the Ram-
sey allocation within an estimated DSGE on the US data and explored its implementation with
simple rules. We share more speciﬁcally the inclusion in the normative analysis of a full set
of disturbance processes. Such feature is of importance in our analysis since welfare computa-
tions and optimal simple rules that we provide in this paper, crucially depend on the structure
of shocks and therefore should be computed with the appropriate exogenous sources of busi-
ness cycles ﬂuctuations. On this point we differ from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2005] and
8
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The original contributions of our paper cover several dimensions. First, we make a special
effort to illustrate the empirical properties of the Ramsey allocation for the euro area. Among
the properties of the optimal monetary policy, we focus in particular on the driving factors
of the Ramsey allocation dynamics compared with the one derived from using the estimated
interest rate rule. Obviously we ﬁrst compare impulse response functions and variance decom-
positions for the historical rule and the Ramsey policy. This allows us to study the stabilization
properties of the optimal policy across the different type of shocks. In addition, using counter-
factual experiments based on the historical shocks for the euro area, we investigate the optimal
policy reaction to ﬂuctuations observed in the past and analyze the role of the various shocks
in explaining the counterfactual dynamics.
A second novelty of our paper is that, unlike Levin et al. [2005], we incorporate the zero
lower bound constraint into the analysis. We try to draw conclusions on the likelihood of oc-
currence of this constraint and more interestingly, on its normative implications. Our results
indicate that contrary to what is shown in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2005], the Ramsey policy
is not operational in the sense that it induces a high probability to tilt the zero bound. This
again points to the importance of taking into account a full set of structural shocks. A more
striking result is the negligible welfare cost of imposing the zero lower bound, meaning that
even if the volatility of the policy instrument is highly constrained, monetary policy is still ef-
fective in improving the welfare of agents.
Third, the paper highlights the need to improve the economic micro-foundation and the
econometric identiﬁcation of the structural disturbances when bringing together estimated
models and optimal policy analysis. In particular, we show that efﬁcient labor supply shocks
and inefﬁcient wage markup shocks are observationally equivalent from the empirical perspec-
tive while they have cruciallydifferent implications for optimal policy. The labor supply shocks
are indeed fully accommodated in the Ramsey allocation whereas the wage markup shocks are
fully allowed to pass-through wage and price dynamics. Therefore, a better understanding of
the labor market sources of ﬂuctuation is required.
9
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a convenient computational technique. In order to approximate the Ramsey allocation with
a simple interest-rate feedback rule, we compute the parameters of the rule by estimating the
model on simulated data from the Ramsey allocation, using full information methods and con-
straining behavioral parameters as well as the stochastic properties of the structural shocks.
This approach consists in ﬁnding the best simple rule in the sense of the marginal density of
the simulated data while traditional approaches would ﬁnd rules maximizing the welfare. Our
method has the advantage of being much more efﬁcient computationally and remains tractable
with more sophisticated interest-rate rules. We show in particular that the optimal rule derived
with this approach presents some similarities with the robust optimal rule in the sense of Gi-
annoni and Woodford [2003a] which exactly replicates the Ramsey allocation in a simpliﬁed
model with price and wage stickiness. Moreover, we computed alternative simple operational
interest-rate rule like Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2005]. Both exercises clearly indicate that such
simple rules can relatively well approximate the Ramsey allocation but are crucially sensitive
to the structure of economic disturbances.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 describes the estimation and reports the results. Section 4 examines the welfare and dynamic
properties of the optimal monetary policy. Section 5 considers the approximation of the op-
timal policy with simple instrument rules and stalndard policy preferences. Finally, section 6
concludes.
2 Theoretical model
The model is mainly based on Christiano et al. [2005] and Smets and Wouters [2003]. The so-
phistication of the modeling framework is ﬁrst guided by the need to match a certain level
data coherence for the euro area, and in this respect, available studies point to an appropriate
set of necessary frictions. However, we prefer to restrain this degree of sophistication in order
to better understand the normative dimensions of the model, and in particular, we restrict our
analysis to a closed economy set-up. Therefore, we introduce in the model some relevant fric-
tions to induce intrinsic persistence in the propagation of shocks, including adjustment costs on
investment and capacity utilization, habit persistence and staggered nominal wage and price
10
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shocks in order to account for the stochastic properties of the observed data.
Concerning policy evaluation, the needed second-order numerical approximation implies
that the exact nonlinear recursive formulation of the complete set of equilibrium conditions
should be derived. This is speciﬁcally relevantfor the equilibrium relations describing the price
and wage settings as well as the micro-foundations of the associated markup shocks. Similarly,
two additional variables which are constant at a ﬁrst-order approximation, now appear in the
nonlinear setting and are related to the measure of price and wage dispersion.
2.1 Households behavior
The economy is populated by a continuum of heterogenous inﬁnitely-lived households. Each
household is characterized by the quality of its labour services, h 2 [0;1]. At time t, the in-















Household h obtains utility from consumption of an aggregate index Ct(h); relative to an in-
ternal habit depending on its past consumption, while receiving disutility from labor Lt(h).
Utility also incorporates a consumption preference shock "B
t and a labor supply shock "L
t . ~ L is
a positive scale parameter.








(1 ¡ ¿w;t)Wt(h)Lt(h) + At(h) + Tt(h)
Pt
+ rk
t ut(h)Kt¡1(h) ¡ ª(ut(h))Kt¡1(h) + ¦t(h)
wherePt isanaggregatepriceindex(seesection2.3), Rt = 1+it istheoneperiodaheadnominal
interest factor, Bt(h) is a nominal bond, It(h) is the investment level Wt(h) is the nominal wage,
Tt(h) and ¿W;t are government transfers and time-varying labor tax, and
rk
t ut(h)Kt¡1(h) ¡ ª(ut(h))Kt¡1(h)
represents the return on the real capital stock minus the cost associated with variations in the
degree of capital utilization. The income from renting out capital services depends on the level
11
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of capacity utilization and is zero at steady state, ª(u?) = 0. ¦t(h) are the dividend emanat-
ing from monopolistically competitive intermediate ﬁrms. Finally At(h) is a stream of income
coming from state contingent securities and equating marginal utility of consumption across
households h 2 [0;1]. Separability of preferences ensures that households have identical con-
sumption and investment plans.
2.1.1 Consumption choices
The ﬁrst order condition related to consumption expenditures is given by
¸t = "B




t+1 (Ct+1 ¡ °Ct)
¡¾c¤
(1)
where ¸t is the lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. The ﬁrst order con-








Due to the assumed internal habit formation, the IS curve implied by the linearization of (1)
and (2) is, in a sense, more forward looking than the one considered by Smets and Wouters
[2003]: here consumption appears at lag one and leads one and two. As we are more interested
in the normative implications of nominal rigidities, we choose an habit formation mechanism
that does not generate by itself a distortion affecting the welfare.
2.2 Investment decisions
The capital is owned by households and rented out to the intermediate ﬁrms at a rental rate
rk
t . Households choose the capital stock, investment and the capacity utilization rate in order
to maximize their intertemporal utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint and the
capital accumulation equation:









where ± 2 (0;1) is the depreciation rate, S is a non negative adjustment cost function such that
S (1) = 0 and "I
t is an efﬁciency shock on the technology of capital accumulation.
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t = ª0 (ut) (6)
We follow Smets and Wouters [2003] by introducing an ad hoc shock "
Q
t accounting for ﬂuctu-
ations of the external ﬁnance risk premium. The functional forms used thereafter are S (x) =
Á=2 (x ¡ 1)
2 and ©(x) = Rk ?
' (exp['(X ¡ 1)] ¡ 1).
2.2.1 Labor supply and wage setting
Each household is a monopoly supplier of a differentiated labour service. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that he sells his services to a perfectly competitive ﬁrm which trans-








µw¡1 and µw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor services.












is the aggregate wage rate.
Households set their wage on a staggered basis. Each period, any household faces a con-
stant probability 1 ¡ ®w of optimally adjusting its nominal wage, say W¤
t (h), which will be the
same for all suppliers of labor services. Otherwise, wages are indexed on past inﬂation and
steady state inﬂation: Wt(h) = [¼t¡1]
»w [¼?]
1¡»w Wt¡1(h) with ¼t = Pt
Pt¡1 the gross rate of (GDP)
inﬂation. Taking into account that they might not be able to choose their nominal wage opti-
mally in a near future, W¤
t (h) is chosen to maximize the intertemporal utility under the budget






















































































where wt denotes the real wage. Note that when wages are perfectly ﬂexible (ie ®w = 0), the








The real wage is equal to a markup
¹w
1¡¿w;t over the marginal rate of substitution between con-


























2.3.1 Final good sector
Final producers are perfectly competitive ﬁrms producing an aggregate ﬁnal good that may
be used for consumption and investment. This production is obtained using a continuum









µp¡1 and µp > 1 is the elasticity of substitution be-
tween differentiated goods. The representative ﬁnal good producer maximizes proﬁts PtYt¡
R 1
0 Pt(z)Yt(z)dz subject to the production function, taking as given the ﬁnal good price Pt and
the prices of all intermediate goods. The ﬁrst order condition for this problem deﬁnes the factor






¹p¡1 Yt, 8z 2 [0;1]. Finally, as the sector is perfectly compet-












® Lt(z)1¡® ¡ ­
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t is an exogenous productivity shock and ­ > 0 is a ﬁxed cost. A ﬁrm z hires its capital,
e Kt(z) = utKt¡1(z), and labor, Lt(z), on a competitive market by minimizing its production











8z 2 [0;1] (10)
the ratio of capital demand to labor demand is constant across ﬁrms. As a consequence, the










t ®®(1 ¡ ®)(1¡®) (11)
is also constant across ﬁrms.















where ¿p;t is a time varying tax on ﬁrm’s revenue. In each period, a ﬁrm z faces a constant
(across time and ﬁrms) probability 1 ¡ ®p of being able to re-optimize its nominal price, say
P¤




(1¡»p) Pt¡1(z) ´ ¡t;t¡1Pt¡1(z), ie the nominal price is indexed on past inﬂation
and steady state inﬂation. Let e Vt be the value at time t of an optimizing ﬁrm and Vt be the value
at time t a non-optimizing ﬁrm. These values are deﬁned as follows:
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As the distribution of prices among the share ®p of producers unable to re-optimize at t is

































When the probability of being able to change prices tends towards unity, (P) implies that the
ﬁrm sets its price equal to a markup
¹p
(1¡¿p;t) over marginal cost.
2.4 Government
Public expenditures G? are subject to random shocks "G
t . The government ﬁnances public
spending with labor tax, product tax and lump-sum transfers:
PtG?"G
t ¡ ¿w;tWtLt ¡ ¿p;tPtYt ¡ PtTt = 0
1Where the cumulated gross price index is deﬁned as
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ﬁed in terms of an interest rate rule: the monetary authority follows generalized Taylor rules
which incorporate deviations of lagged inﬂation and the lagged output gap deﬁned as the dif-
ference between actual and ﬂexible-price output. Such reaction functions also incorporate a
non-systematic component "r
t: Written in deviation from the steady state, the interest feedback
rule used in the estimation has the form:
^ Rt = ½ ^ Rt¡1 + (1 ¡ ½)[r¼^ ¼t¡1 + ry^ yt¡1] + r¢¼¢^ ¼t + r¢y¢^ yt + "r
t (15)
where a hat over a variable denotes log-deviation of that variable from its deterministic steady-
state level.
2.5 Market clearing conditions
Aggregate demand is given by:
Yt = Ct + It + G?"G
t + ª(ut)Kt¡1 (16)
where Kt =
R 1
0 Kt(z)dz is the aggregate demand of capital. Market clearing condition on goods

































¹p¡1 dz and Lt =
R 1
0 Lt(z)dz is the aggregate labor input. ¢p;t measures
the price dispersion due to the staggered price setting. As in the case of the aggregate price
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We already mentioned that all household have the same consumption plans. Consequently,


















































The competitive equilibrium is a set of stationary processes ut, Qt, It, Kt, rk
t , Ct, ¸t, Lt, MCt,
¼t, ¢p;t, Z1;t, Z2;t, wt, Hw
1;t, Hw












t and initial conditions C¡1, I¡1, K¡1, ¢p;¡1,
¼¡1, ¢w;¡1 and w¡1.
3 Bayesian estimation of the linearized model
The exogenous shocks can be divided in three categories:
² Efﬁcient shocks: shocks on technology, investment, labor supply (supply shocks), public
expenditures and consumption preferences (demand shocks).
² Inefﬁcient shocks: shocks on goods market markups, labor market markups, external risk
premium (markup shocks).
² Policy shock: shock on the residual of the Taylor rule (Monetary Policy shocks).
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We consider 7 key macro-economic quarterly time series from 1973q1 to 2004q4: output, con-
sumption, investment, hours worked, real wages, GDP deﬂator inﬂation rate, and 3 month
short-term interest rate. Euro area data are taken from Fagan et al (2001) and Eurostat. Con-
cerning the euro area, employment numbers replace hours. Consequently, as in Smets and
Wouters [2003], hours are linked to the number of people employed et with the following dy-
namics (in deviation from the steady state):
et = ¯Etet+1 +
(1 ¡ ¯®e)(1 ¡ ®e)
®e
(lt ¡ et)
Aggregate real variables are expressed per capita by dividing with working age population.
All the data are detrended before the estimation.
3.2 Parameters estimates
Some parameters are ﬁxed prior to estimation. This concerns generally parameters driving the
steady state values of the state variables for which the econometric model including detrended
data is quasi uninformative. The discount factor ¯ is calibrated to 0.99, which implies annual
steady state real interest rates of 4%. The depreciation rate ± is equal to 0.0025 per quarter.
Markups are 1.3 in the goods market and 1.5 in the labor market. The steady state is consistent
with labor income share in total output of 70%. Shares of consumption and investment in total
output are respectively 0.65 and 0.18.
All the results are obtained with Dynare, a matlab toolbox aimed at simulating and estimat-
ing DSGE models. The estimation strategy may be decomposed in three steps. First the lin-
earized version of the rational expectation model is solved, so that the dynamics are described
in a state-space representation (non linear in the deep parameters). Second, the posterior ker-
nel of the model (i.e. the log-prior densities plus the log-likelihood of the model obtained by
running a Kalman ﬁlter) is evaluated and maximized. Third, once the posterior mode is found,
we get the entire posterior distribution by implementing a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
Regarding the prior distributions (see Table 1), the standard errors of the innovations are
assumed to follow uniform distributions. In DSGE models, data are often very informative
about the variance of structural disturbances so those very loose priors seem well suited. The
19
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low a beta distribution with mean 0.85 and standard error 0.1. Concerning the parameters of
the Taylor rule, we follow Smets and Wouters [2003]: the long run coefﬁcient on inﬂation and
output gap are described by a Normal distribution with mean 1.5 and 0.125, and standard er-
rors 0.1 and 0.05 respectively. The persistence parameter follows a normal around 0.75 with a
standard error of 0.1. The prior on the short run reaction coefﬁcients to inﬂation and output
gap changes reﬂect the assumptions of a gradual adjustment towards the long run. Concern-
ing preference parameters, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set at 1 with standard
error of 0.375. The habit parameter is centered on 0.7 with standard deviation of 0.1 and the
elasticity of labor supply has mean 2 and standard error of 0.75. Adjustment cost parameter for
investment follows a N(4;2) and the capacity utilization elasticity is set at 0.2 with a standard
error of 0.1. Concerning the Calvo probabilities of price and wage settings, we assume a beta
distribution around 0.75. The degree of indexation to past inﬂation is centered on 0.5.
Tab. 1: PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS
Parameter Distribution Mean Std. dev.
¾c Normal 1.000 0.375
¾L Normal 2.000 0.750
° Beta 0.700 0.1000
®p, ®w, ®e Beta 0.750 0.050
»p, »w Beta 0.500 0.150
Á Gamma 0.200 0.100
' Normal 4.000 2.00
r¼ Normal 1.500 0.100
r¢¼ Gamma 0.300 0.100
ry Gamma 0.125 0.050
r¢y Gamma 0.063 0.050
½ Beta 0.750 0.100
½A, ½B, ½G, ½L, ½I Beta 0.850 0.100
¾"A ,¾"p, ¾"w Uniform 2.000 1.155
¾"B, ¾"L, ¾"Q Uniform 5.000 2.887
¾"G, ¾"I, ¾"r Uniform 3.000 1.732
Overall, the posterior distributions of the structural parameters are relatively similar to the
one reported in Smets and Wouters [2003] even if our model speciﬁcation is slightly different
(see Table 2). In particular, we do not introduce a shock on the central bank inﬂation objective
20
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we consider here internal habits on consumption and not external habits since the latter would
generate an addition source of non-Pareto optimality of the steady state. It is worth emphasiz-
ing that two parameters in particular are badly identiﬁed: the labor supply elasticity and the
term on level inﬂation in the Taylor rule.
Tab. 2: POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS
Parameters Post. mode Post. mean HPD inf HPD sup
¾c 1.9614 1.9591 1.5459 2.3997
¾L 1.5027 1.8004 0.5957 3.0612
° 0.4209 0.4366 0.3026 0.5546
®p 0.9089 0.9098 0.8928 0.9260
®w 0.7496 0.7660 0.7065 0.8292
®e 0.8436 0.8448 0.8238 0.8659
»p 0.2196 0.2434 0.1350 0.3491
»w 0.2512 0.2624 0.1142 0.3975
' 4.7521 4.8144 4.1001 5.5343
Á 0.7807 0.8279 0.4968 1.1433
r¼ 1.5657 1.5762 1.4378 1.7163
r¢¼ 0.2021 0.2015 0.1362 0.2609
½ 0.8794 0.750 0.8551 0.9059
ry 0.0970 0.125 0.0449 0.1591
r¢y 0.2030 0.2033 0.1531 0.2494
½A 0.9942 0.9861 0.9738 0.9991
½B 0.8738 0.8666 0.7986 0.9376
½G 0.9720 0.9633 0.9348 0.9906
½L 0.9696 0.9591 0.9390 0.9798
½I 0.9500 0.9325 0.8850 0.9790
¾"A 0.5640 0.6001 0.5008 0.5008
¾"B 2.1191 2.3108 1.6807 1.6807
¾"G 1.8379 1.8551 1.6702 1.6702
¾"L 3.7088 4.7944 1.9603 1.9603
¾"I 1.0029 1.1090 0.7742 0.7742
¾"r 0.1830 0.1860 0.1626 0.1626
¾"Q 6.3809 6.4534 5.2116 5.2116
¾"p 0.2826 0.2945 0.2574 0.2574
¾"w 0.1949 0.2008 0.1656 0.1656
Regarding the estimation of the Taylor rule, we investigated the sensitivity of structural pa-
rameter estimates to diffuse priors and alternative speciﬁcation (see Table 3). It turns out that
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Parameter estimates other than the labor supply elasticity remain however broadly unchanged.
In the rest of the paper, the estimated Taylor rule considered for comparison exercises corre-
sponds to the estimation of the benchmark model.
Tab. 3: POSTERIOR PARAMETERS, SENSITIVITY TO MONETARY POLICY RULE SPECIFICATION
Benchmark Benchmark output gap output gap Taylor Taylor wage
Diffuse priors Diffuse priors
½A 0.994 0.993 0.993 0.997 0.975 0.984
½B 0.874 0.863 0.755 0.768 0.390 0.386
½G 0.972 0.968 0.952 0.939 0.972 0.979
½L 0.970 0.972 0.959 0.971 0.951 0.964
½I 0.950 0.935 0.954 0.945 0.906 0.907
' 4.752 4.727 4.873 4.863 5.076 5.003
¾C 1.961 1.901 1.618 1.632 1.185 1.205
h 0.421 0.427 0.628 0.623 0.879 0.854
®W 0.750 0.751 0.693 0.681 0.731 0.680
¾L 1.503 1.368 2.975 3.091 2.215 2.329
®P 0.909 0.910 0.902 0.902 0.927 0.930
¸E 0.844 0.843 0.838 0.844 0.843 0.855
»W 0.251 0.250 0.294 0.297 0.229 0.250
»P 0.220 0.225 0.297 0.282 0.224 0.218
Á 0.781 0.751 0.952 0.984 0.752 0.754
r¼ 1.566 2.501 1.498 0.892 1.215 0.297
r¢¼ 0.202 0.172 0.125 0.032 – –
½ 0.879 0.931 0.946 0.947 0.862 0.878
ry 0.097 0.253 0.126 0.236 0.133 0.120
r¢y 0.203 0.252 0.244 0.257 – –
rw – – – – – 0.909
LDDa -467.452 -470.370 -463.371 -463.840 -502.054 -496.726
aMarginal densities obtained with the Laplace approximation.
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4.1 Ramsey equilibrium
We deﬁne the Ramsey policy as the monetary policy under commitment which maximizes the
intertemporal household’s welfare. Formally, the Ramsey equilibrium is a set of processes ut,
Qt, It, Kt, rk
t , Ct, ¸t, Lt, MCt, ¼t, ¢p;t, Z1;t, Z2;t, wt, Hw
1;t, Hw




















subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions (1)-(14), (16)-(19), and the constraint:
Rt ¸ 1 (i)










t , values of the
variables listed above dated t Á 0, and values of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints listed above dated t Á 0.
The Ramsey policy is therefore computed by formulating an inﬁnite-horizon Lagrangian
problem of maximizing the conditional expected social welfare subject to the full set of non-
linear constraints forming the competitive equilibrium of the model. The ﬁrst order conditions
to this problem are obtained using symbolic Matlab routines.
As it is common in the optimal monetary policy literature (see for example Khan et al.
[2003] and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2005]), we assume a particular recursive formulation of
thepolicycommitmentlabeledbyWoodford[2003]asoptimalityfromatimelessperspective. This
imposes that the policy rule which is optimal in the latter periods is also optimal in the initial
period and avoids the problem of ﬁnding initial conditions for the lagrange multipliers, which
are now endogenous and given by their steady state values.
Since we are mainly interested in comparing the macroeconomic stabilization performances
of different monetary policy regimes, we assume a ﬁscal intervention, namely subsidies on la-
bor and goods markets, to offset the ﬁrst order distortions caused by the presence of monop-
olistic competition in the markets. This ensure that the steady state is efﬁcient, and that the
ﬂexible price equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Note that those constraints can be easily relaxed
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ties of the Ramsey policy. The case of an inefﬁcient steady state is nonetheless considered in
the sensitivity analysis of section 4.3.
The inequality constraint (i) ensures that the zero lower bound (henceforth ZLB) on the
nominal interest rate is not violated. Before going further into the optimal policy properties,
we need to evaluate the quantitative relevance of this constraint. Let us deﬁne the deviation of
interest rate from its steady state ^ Rt = (Rt¡R?)=R?. Given that, in the steady state, ¯ = ¼?=R?,
the interest rate does not hit the ZLB if and only if:
^ Rt > ¯=¼? ¡ 1 (ii)
To assess the relevance of the ZLB we then simply need to examine the stationary distribution
of ^ Rt under different monetary policy regimes. Our results (see Figure 1) indicate that the esti-
mated rule implies a probability to tilt the zero bound of 13.7 percent under a zero steady state
inﬂation rate, ¼? = 1, and 5 percent under a more reasonable two percent annual inﬂation rate,
¼? = 1:005. This result calls two comments. First, it highlights the only role left to the steady
state inﬂation rate in our model, which is its effects on the ZLB constraint. Second, it obviously
gives a rationale for a positive inﬂation target rate (here the steady state rate) in order to pre-
vent central banks from hitting the ZLB.
Up to our knowledge, one of the few studies which tried to quantify the probability of
hitting the zero bound in the euro area is Coenen [2003]. This paper reports, for an annual in-
ﬂation rate of 2 percent, probabilities in a range of 2% to 17%, depending on speciﬁc modeling
assumptions. Our estimates fall into this range, albeit closer to the lower bound.
Now moving to the Ramsey policy, we ﬁnd a probability to tilt the zero bound around
37.5 percent in a zero inﬂation steady state that only slightly falls to 31.7% under a 2% annual
steady state inﬂation rate, making our Ramsey policy not operational. This sharply contrasts
with recent results obtained by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2005] within a medium scale macroe-
conomic model comparable to ours. They conclude that the low frequency of bindings of the
ZLB makes it irrelevant as a constraint of the Ramsey problem. Where does this difference
come from? It seems that the inclusion of a richer structure of shocks, as opposed to three
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Fig. 1: PROBABILITY TO HIT THE ZERO BOUND






































Note: The straight and dashed black vertical lines plots (ii) for ¼? = 1 and
¼? = 1:005 respectively.
The ZLB is an occasionally binding constraint. To handle it, once need to resort on non-
linear global approximations solutions methods (see Christiano and Fisher [1997]). In a model
like ours, any attempt to use these methods is very much complicated by the associated com-
putational burden. To avoid high probabilities of hitting the zero bound under the Ramsey al-
location, we thus follow Woodford [2003] by introducing in the households welfare a quadratic
term penalizing the variance of the nominal interest rate:
WIR
t = Wt + ¸rEt
1 X
j=0
¯j (Rt+j ¡ R?)
2 (20)
where ¸r is the weight attached to the cost on nominal interest rate ﬂuctuations. Instead of
ﬁxing this parameter to match a particular value of the probability to hit the zero bound, we
pragmatically choose to calibrate ¸r so that, under the operational Ramsey policy (referred
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historical one (see Figure 1). Under this assumption, the probability to hit the zero bound is
now reasonably low, for both ¼? = 1 and ¼? = 1:005.
Therefore, in order to make the Ramsey operational, we constrain the volatility of the pol-
icy instrument. Does it mean that the zero bound really limits the economic effectiveness of
monetary policy? The following section investigates the property of the constrained Ramsey
allocation. Unless otherwise indicated, our results are computed at the mode of the estimated
posterior distribution of the parameters.
4.2 Comparison of the constrained and unconstrained Ramsey allocation
In order to investigate the implications of the additional welfare penalization for interest rate
ﬂuctuations on the optimal policy, we ﬁrst compare the welfare costs of both policies, using
conditional welfare on the steady state Ramsey allocation. More speciﬁcally, we compute the
fraction of consumption stream from alternative monetary policy regime to be added (or sub-
tracted) to achieve the reference level corresponding to the allocation following the estimated
policy rule. That is, we measure the welfare cost in percentage points, welfarecost = Ã £ 100 ,





































t is the welfare obtained under the estimated policy rule, Xa
t denotes the variable Xt











Table 4 reports welfare cost measures relative to the estimated rule, where the non con-
strained optimal policy is referred as the Ramsey while the operational one is referred as the
RamseyIR. First, we can observe that the welfare costs are similar with the Ramsey or Ram-
seyIR, amounting respectively to 2.15 and 2.14 percent loss in consumption each period. There-
fore, even if the volatility of the policy instrument is highly constrained, monetary policy is
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compare the distribution of the welfare costs drawn from the posterior distribution of the pa-
rameters (see Figure 2). The distribution of the Ramsey and RamseyIR welfare costs are almost
identical.
Turning to second order moments, Table 4 shows that the penalization for interest rate
volatility in the welfare function is not affecting strongly the variance of output components
and inﬂation in the optimal allocation. The same conclusion will hold by analyzing the respec-
tive impulse responses and variance decompositions under both policy regimes. Consequently,
the operational feature that we implemented in the Ramsey allocation is sufﬁcient to maintain
the ﬂuctuations of the policy rates within reasonable range but does not deteriorate signiﬁ-
cantly the stabilization properties of the optimal policy. In the following sections, the Ramsey
policy will refer to the optimal allocation derived by using the modiﬁed welfare function and
will be compared with the estimated rule across several dimensions.
Fig. 2: WELFARE COST POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS
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As mentioned in the previous section, the conditional welfare gain of the optimal policy com-
pared with the estimated rule is around 2.1 percentage point of consumption (see Table4). Such
gain is even higher when measured by unconditional welfare. By construction, the uncondi-
tional welfare measure is a weighted average of the conditional welfare levels associated with
all possible values of the state vector with weights given by their unconditional probabilities.
With this measure, the gain of optimal policy over the estimated rules averages 3.5%. In terms
of volatility of macroeconomic aggregates, the Ramsey allocation allows for more ﬂuctuations
in real quantities while the variations of inﬂation and nominal wage growth are much more
muted than with the estimated rule. Finally, the welfare gains of the Ramsey allocation are also
illustrated by the higher unconditional mean levels of both real and nominal variables.
Tab. 4: SELECTED SECOND ORDER MOMENTS
Estimated Ramsey RamseyIR
Std. dev.
Output 5.26 7.26 7.25
Consumption 6.28 7.61 7.59
Investment 12.27 17.42 17.44
Wage Inﬂation 1.11 0.29 0.32
Inﬂation 0.97 0.27 0.27
Interest Rate 0.91 3.13 0.74
Stochastic Steady State Deviations
Output 3.50 5.31 5.42
Consumption 2.13 4.39 4.52
Investment 20.97 23.18 23.34
Wage Inﬂation -0.61 0.02 0.02
Inﬂation -0.61 0.02 0.02
Interest Rate -0.61 -0.04 -0.01
Welfare
Cond. cost 0 -2.15 -2.14
Uncond. cost 0 -3.49 -3.51
Cond. level -173.35 -170.92 -170.93
Uncond. level -171.27 -167.34 -167.32
The results presented in Table 4 are obtained assuming subsidies in product and labor mar-
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analyze the implications of removing the subsidies and lowering the markups. In theory, the
effect of removing the steady state subsidies on welfare cost is ambiguous as depending of
the level of distortions and the structure of disturbances in particular. An in depth analysis
of the implications of steady state inefﬁciencies on the Ramsey allocation in such a medium-
scale framework is left for further research. Empirically, the welfare costs increase without the
subsidies in the benchmark case, augmenting by 0.6 percentage point . Standard deviations
of real and nominal variable are slightly higher across both policies when the subsidies are re-
moved. Regarding the stochastic steady state, the unconditional mean levels of inﬂation and
wage growth are left quasi unchanged while the mean levels of real variable are substantially
higher for the optimal policy without subsidies.
4.4 Impulse responses analysis
The dynamics of the Ramsey allocation is computed by solving the ﬁrst-order approximation
of the equilibrium conditions. Figures 3 to 10 in the appendix show the median impulse re-
sponse functions and the 80% posterior IRF density interval for the estimated Taylor rule and
the Ramsey policy.
Regarding productivity shock, the Ramsey allocation generates a stronger and faster re-
sponse of real variables and real wage while the downward pressures on prices are much more
limited. The associated interest rate path is more accommodative in the short term but reverts
very rapidly to its initial level. Notice that over longer horizons, the response of real variables
becomes signiﬁcantly closer in both monetary regimes. The other efﬁcient supply shock in the
model is the labor supply shock for which the differences highlighted above turn out to be even
more pronounced. The timely and hump-shaped decrease in interest rate under the Ramsey
policy stimulates output, consumption and investment while leaving quasi unchanged inﬂa-
tion and real wages. By contrast, the estimated rule is not supportive enough to prevent a
decrease in real wage and inﬂation.
Turning to efﬁcient demand shocks, the Ramsey policy leans against preference shocks.
The increase in consumption is more limited than under the estimated rule and the contrac-
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icy while inﬂation and real wages are almost fully stabilized. Under the estimated rule, the
preference shock is expansionary on GDP and upward pressures emerge on real wages and
inﬂation. Differences are less pronounced for the other shocks affecting demand components.
The responses of GDP, consumption, investment and real wages to an investment shock or a
government spending shock are relatively similar under the Ramsey policy and the estimated
rule. However the inﬂation response is much more muted in the Ramsey allocation.
Considering inefﬁcient shocks, the transmission of price markup shocks to the economy is
not strongly different under both monetary regimes, suggesting similar inﬂation (prices and
wage)/output tradeoff for this type of shock. However, in the case of wage markup shocks
and external ﬁnance premium shocks, the Ramsey policy is much more restrictive, delivering
lower real variables and more stable inﬂation.
Overall, compared with the estimated Taylor rule, the Ramsey policy accommodates more
strongly the efﬁcient supply shocks, leans more against efﬁcient demand shocks, and in the
case of markup shocks, tilts the inﬂation/output tradeoff towards inﬂation stabilization. In ad-
dition, the optimal policy is much more responsive to labor market shocks than the estimated
rule which incorporates only goods market variables such as inﬂation and output.
4.5 Variance decomposition
Turning now to the contribution of the various structural shocks to the variance of forecast
errors, the comparison between the results obtained under the estimated rule and the one as-
sociated with the Ramsey allocation conﬁrms the properties identiﬁed above (see Table 5).
Regarding activity, the contribution of efﬁcient supply shocks to the variance of forecast
errors on output is much higher under the Ramsey policy over the short to medium term. In
particular, the labor supply shock accounts for around 75% of the forecast errors at a two years
horizon under the Ramsey policy, compared with less than 5% under the estimated rule. Con-
versely, demand shocks, price markup shocks and equity premium shocks contribute more
strongly with the estimated rule up to a two years horizon. Wage markup shocks have a
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stronger impact on forecast errors in the Ramsey allocation.Tab. 5: COMPARISON OF VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION
Estimated Ramsey
Quarters 0 4 8 1 0 4 8 1
Output
"A 1.32 0.71 4.17 61.03 3.69 8.80 11.20 47.82
"L 0 0.45 4.66 25.27 61.56 72.02 73.04 46.50
"I 0.11 3.17 7.9 3.47 0.82 2.18 2.70 1.42
"B 30.86 30.98 22.08 2.14 0.16 4.01 4.63 1.51
"G 20.65 8.6 6.52 1.44 15.11 3.71 2.63 1.24
"r 20.47 39.33 41.22 5.21 – – – –
"Q 22 10.51 7.48 0.74 4.50 0.49 0.27 0.06
"p 4.01 6.08 5.83 0.67 2.00 1.73 1.56 0.51
"w 0.59 0.17 0.13 0.03 12.15 7.06 3.98 0.95
Inﬂation
"A 13.08 29.92 32.72 60.59 1.74 6.58 7.55 7.80
"L 14.48 37.72 43.26 30.17 0.07 0.28 0.28 0.56
"I 0 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.13
"B 1.14 2.64 2.62 1.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06
"G 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
"r 0.99 2.41 2.51 1.15 – – – –
"Q 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
"p 70.05 26.87 18.49 6.71 98.15 93.06 92.06 91.36
"w 0.19 0.26 0.2 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06
Interest Rate
"A 4.42 16.88 24.48 63.57 1.64 2.51 2.49 2.67
"L 2.10 20.25 32.56 25.15 7.89 14.03 14.51 15.45
"I 0.05 1.85 3.67 2.43 0.19 0.20 0.52 2.43
"B 16.61 26.27 19.21 4.45 8.28 24.72 28.06 27.19
"G 8.58 3.71 2.12 0.49 0.28 0.50 0.53 0.63
"r 54.66 23.17 13.12 2.86 – – – –
"Q 9.97 5.98 3.70 0.79 10.61 8.68 8.20 7.83
"p 3.16 1.50 0.87 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.28
"w 0.45 0.39 0.27 0.06 71.08 49.33 45.53 43.52
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cast errors. While efﬁcient supply shocks account for 90% of inﬂation variance in the long run
under the estimated rule, this share is reduced to less than 10% under the Ramsey policy. Price
markup shocks are the main source of forecast errors in the very short term with the estimated
rule but its contribution rapidly decreases at longer horizon. Under the Ramsey policy, price
markup shocks explain more than 90% of forecast errors at all horizon.
Concerning interest rates, efﬁcient supply shocks contribute relatively more to the variance
of forecast errors under the estimated rule, at all horizon. Efﬁcient demand shocks contribute
more in the short run but less in the long run under the estimated rule. The main difference re-
gards the wage markup shocks which explains more than 40% of forecast errors in the medium
term under the Ramsey policy, compared with less than 1% under the estimated rule.
4.6 Counterfactual analysis
Moreover, the particularfeaturesofthe optimalpolicy highlighted previouslycan beillustrated
in terms of counterfactuals (see Figures 11 to 14 in the appendix). Given the estimated struc-
tural shocks, we simulate the path of the main macroeconomic aggregates under the Ramsey
policy. Overall, the optimal policy would have implied higher GDP growth in the mid-80’s
and in the mid-90’s but lower growth around 1990 and 2000. The dynamics of consumption
would not have been signiﬁcantly affected and investment would have accounted for most of
the GDP growth differences. Inﬂation and the model-based output gap would have been much
more stable under the Ramsey policy. This outcome would have been achieved with a path of
the policy qualitatively similar to the observed one but with a higher amplitude of the policy
changes. Notice that the strong performance of the Ramsey policy in terms of output gap and
inﬂation comes at a limited cost regarding the policy rate volatility. Let us now turn to a com-
parison of the contribution of historical shocks to activity, inﬂation and interest rate under the
Ramsey policy and the estimated rule.
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been somewhat less pronounced. Examining the level contributions of structural shocks, the
contributions of productivity shocks are not strongly different while the contribution of labor
supply shocks is much higher with the optimal policy. Consequently, the contribution of ef-
ﬁcient supply shocks to GDP growth is signiﬁcantly positive under the Ramsey allocation in
the end-90’s while it is slightly negative under the estimated Taylor rule. Similarly, preference
shocks have spill-overs on GDP, and therefore contributions, of opposite signs between the
Ramsey and the estimated rule: during the period the ﬁrst half of the 90’s, demand shocks are
contributing negatively to GDP growth under the estimated rule but bring a strong positive
contribution under the Ramsey policy.
Regarding inﬂation, markup contributions are relatively similar under the Ramsey policy
and the estimated rule. Demand shocks however have quasi no impact on inﬂation with the
optimal policy. Regarding efﬁcient supply shocks, on balance, their contributions to inﬂation
have even opposite signs over some sub-sample periods (in particular for the second half of
the 90’s). This is due to the difference between the transmission mechanisms of labor shocks
and productivity shocks under both monetary regimes. With the estimated Taylor rule, pro-
ductivity and labor supply shocks have similar impact on inﬂation while the Ramsey policy
induces a signiﬁcantly more muted inﬂationary effect of labor supply shocks compared with
productivity shocks.
Another striking feature of the Ramsey policy regards the interest rate sensitivity to markup
shocks. The charts indicate that the optimal policy would have required much stronger reac-
tions of the policy rate to the historical markup shocks than the estimated Taylor rule. In partic-
ular, the negative wage-markup shocks recorded from 2002 to 2005 call for lower annual short
term interest rate by around 100 bp.
Overall, the analysis of the macroeconomic stabilization properties of the Ramsey policy
on the basis of the estimated behaviors and disturbances clearly showed that the typology of
efﬁcient and inefﬁcient shocks matters crucially. Unfortunately, the estimation of DSGE mod-
els may fail to statistically identify the relative structure of economic disturbances which have
dramatically different normative implications. A precise example of such conﬁguration relates
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Regarding GDP growth, the Ramsey allocation would have generated more volatility onto the labor market shocks speciﬁed in the model. For the estimation, we introduced a labor
supply shock, following an AR(1) process, and a wage markup shocks with an i.i.d. distribu-
tion. Without such differences in the stochastic distribution of the shocks, models with only
labor supply or wage markup shocks would be observationally equivalent with a ﬁrst order
approximation of the model. However, as we have seen from the impulse response, variance
decomposition and counterfactual analysis, the labor supply shocks call for a strong accommo-
dation by the optimal policy resulting in negligible impact on inﬂation and wages while the
wage markup shocks, due to their distortive nature, are allowed to pass-through the nominal
side.
5 Optimal Simple rules
The Ramsey allocation obviously constitutes a key normative benchmark to assess the policy
implications of the model micro-foundations and the relative role of alternative frictions and
structural shocks. Nonetheless, as the size of the model expands, it becomes more difﬁcult but
more necessary to streamline the features of optimal stabilization. An approximation of the
optimal policy with a simple interest rate rule has generally been considered by the literature
as a useful simpliﬁcation of the optimal behavior.
The approach of Giannoni and Woodford [2003a,b] to derive the robust optimal monetary
policy rule can in principle be implemented in our DSGE framework using the ﬁrst order ap-
proximation of the ﬁrst order conditions for the Ramsey problem described in this paper. The
initial methodology proposed by the authors is based on a Linear-Quadratic framework and
therefore implies the derivation of a quadratic approximation of the welfare like in Benigno
and Woodford [2006]. In this context, the optimal rule will only involve target variables. In ad-
dition, such rule is robust to the sense that it continues to be optimal regardless of the structure
and the statistical properties of the exogenous disturbances hitting the economy. The compu-
tation of this approach is beyond the scope of this paper but represents a promising way since
it provides a policy rule which exactly implements the Ramsey allocation up to the ﬁrst order
approximation. Note also that this approach can lead to relatively complicated robust optimal
rule when using medium to large-scale models, implying that ﬁnding more simple optimal
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our modeling framework is an expanded version of the applications considered by Giannoni
and Woodford [2003b], we ﬁrst intend to specify an interest rate rule inspired from the optimal
robust rules derived by the authors within a simpliﬁed DSGE framework with mainly price
and wage rigidities. We consider an optimal simple rule of the (loglinearized) form:
^ Rt = ½1 ^ Rt¡1 + ½2 ^ Rt¡2 + r¼^ ¼t + r¢¼¢^ ¼t + rW ^ ¼w
t + r¢W¢^ ¼w
t + rY ^ y
gap
t + r¢y¢^ y
gap
t
The rule features an AR(2) on the policy rate and reacts to inﬂation and its ﬁrst difference,
nominal wage inﬂation and its ﬁrst difference, as well as model-based output gap and its ﬁrst
difference.
Tab. 6: POSTERIOR PARAMETERS OF ORC RULES WITH DIFFERENT SET OF SHOCKS
Shocks r¼ r¢¼ rw r¢w ry r¢y ½1 ½2 LDDa
All
ORC1 0.263 – 0.959 – – – 1.637 -0.738 -393.031
ORC2 0.252 – 1.243 – 0.102 – 1.942 -0.865 -381.520
ORC3 0.090 0.139 1.399 -0.167 0.127 -0.053 1.909 -0.766 -390.682
No "w
ORC1 0.520 – 0.948 – – – 1.219 -0.422 -120.589
ORC2 0.357 – 1.191 – 0.064 – 1.279 -0.418 -78.432
ORC3 0.821 0.106 1.214 -0.112 -0.001 0.779 2.002 -1.022 -16.025
No "w,"Q
ORC1 0.261 – 0.429 – – – 1.463 -0.599 77.984
ORC2 0.191 – 0.538 – 0.030 – 1.447 -0.554 94.021
ORC3 0.723 0.109 0.758 -0.041 -0.057 0.941 2.175 -1.190 225.247
Efﬁcient
ORC1 1.493 – 1.715 – – – 1.672 -0.733 425.895
ORC2 1.428 – 1.692 – 0.010 – 1.668 -0.723 420.112
ORC3 1.425 -2.563 1.767 0.854 0.008 1.011 2.334 -1.400 485.242
aMarginal densities obtained with the Laplace approximation.
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In order to obtain the interest rule approximating the Ramsey allocation, we simulated themodel variables under the Ramsey policy given the estimated parameters and the stochastic
distribution of structural shocks. Then we estimated the posterior distribution of the coefﬁ-
cients of the interest rate rule using the generated counterfactual data and applying the same
estimation techniques and the same set of observed variables than the one used to estimate
the benchmark model. We assumed uniform priors on the coefﬁcients of the rule and left un-
changed the other structural parameters and the variance of the structural shocks. This ap-
proach has the advantage to be much more efﬁcient in terms of optimization and more ﬂexible
in terms of rule speciﬁcation. The best rule is selected using the log data density (LDD) of the
simulated dataset and is referred thereafter as ORC (see Table 6). It appears clearly that the
design of the optimal simple rule varies signiﬁcantly with the structure of the shocks present
in the economy.
When all the shocks are accounted for, wage inﬂation turns out to be an important factor
shaping the interest rate reaction, compared with more traditional Taylor rules, and enters the
rule with a much higher coefﬁcient than the GDP deﬂator inﬂation. Another interesting fea-
ture of the Taylor Ramsey is the super inertia on interest rates. The optimal rule implies not only
intrinsic inertia in the dynamics of the interest rate (since a transitory deviation of the inﬂa-
tion rate from its average value increases the interest rate in both the current quarter and the
subsequent quarter), but also induces an explosive dynamic for the interest rate if the initial
overshooting of the long-run average inﬂation rate is not offset by a subsequent undershooting
(which actually always happens in equilibrium). This super inertia property is preserved when
changing the structure of the shocks.
However, by removing one after the other all the markup shocks from the disturbances set,
the coefﬁcients of the optimal rule are sensibly modiﬁed. In particular, the coefﬁcient on the
ﬁrst difference term of the output gap increases as the inefﬁcient shocks are removed and the
presence of ﬁrst difference terms strongly improve the performance of the simple optimal rule,
in the sense of the marginal density. This illustrates again the need to derive optimal simple
interest rate rules which are robust to the structure of economic shocks.
The literature on optimal monetary policy has extensively explored the alternative ways to
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implement the Ramsey equilibrium using simple feedback interest rate rules. As in Schmitt-Tab. 7: OWB RULES
Rule ½ r¼ r¼w WelfareCost
1 0.947 0.769 1.6922 -1.474
2 0.615 2 – -1.403
3 1 – 2.076 -1.467
No ZLB constraint 0.816 1.494 4 -1.478
No inefﬁcient shocks 1.111 4 3.7895 –
Grohe and Uribe [2004] it aims at ﬁnding parameterizations of interest rate rules maximizing
the welfare conditional on the deterministic steady state of the Ramsey economy. These rules
also satisfy the requirements of local uniqueness of the rational expectation equilibrium and
low probability to violate of the ZLB. Such concept of optimal operational rule has been im-
plemented in our framework using a second-order numerical approximation of the conditional
welfare (20) and a simple grid search optimization routine.
However, since the optimization procedure is relatively time consuming, we restrained the
interest rule to the form:
^ Rt = ½ ^ Rt¡1 + r¼^ ¼t + rW ^ ¼w
t
The best rule has signiﬁcant interest rate smoothing and reacts both to price inﬂation and wage
inﬂation (see Table 7). The preferred optimal operational rule within the class considered here,
has a higher weight on nominal wage growth than on inﬂation and features a relatively high
degree of interest rate smoothing. Those features are even more pronounced when the con-
straint on the zero lower bound is relaxed. Thereafter, we refer to this rule as the optimal
welfare-based rule (OWB). Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2005] argue that the beneﬁts of interest
rate smoothing are limited in terms of welfare and that simple rules responding aggressively
to price inﬂation already represent a good approximation of the Ramsey policy. Nonetheless,
within their framework which differs from ours in particular on the shock structure and on the
micro-foundation of the labor market frictions, higher wage rigidity leads to an optimal rule
withastrongrelativeweightonwageinﬂationandsuperinertialresponsetolaggedinterestrate.
The micro-foundations of the labor market nominal frictions in our model are different from
theirs. In particular, for a same estimated elasticity of wage to the marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption, the implied Calvo-type rigidities in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
[2005] would be higher than in our case. Therefore, given the estimated parameter for wage
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ness exposed by the authors. Regarding the sensitivity of the optimal operational rule to the
structure of the shocks, the coefﬁcients of the rule obtained when only the efﬁcient shocks are
introduced, change signiﬁcantly with higher weights on both price and wage inﬂation. Once
again, this indicates that such simple rule are not robust in the sense ofGiannoni and Woodford
[2003a].
Finally, we examine the performance of both the OWB and the ORC rules in approximat-
ing the Ramsey allocation through different dimensions: comparison of the welfare (see Figure
2), counterfactual analysis (see Figure 23 in the appendix) and impulse response analysis (see
Figures 15 to 22 in the appendix). Broadly speaking, while the two simple rules deliver rela-
tively similar allocations to the Ramsey policy they have a hard time in matching the Ramsey’s
welfare cost level. Under simple rules it decreases by 0.7 percentage point. Taking into account
structural parameters uncertainty as in section (4.3) reinforces the latter point and illustrates
the lack of robustness to parameter uncertainty for this kind of simple rules (see Figure 2). Fi-
nally returning to the dynamics, the more pronounced differences are related the dynamics of
the interest rate and the transmission of markup shocks.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have built on the literature estimating DSGEs in order to explore within a
more operational framework, the normative prescriptions of such structural models regarding
the optimal conduct of monetary policy over the business cycle. We ﬁnd that:
1. The Ramsey policy is not operational in the sense that it induces a high probability to
tilt the zero bound. A more striking result is the negligible welfare cost of imposing the
zero lower bound, meaning that even if the volatility of the policy instrument is highly
constrained, monetary policy is still effective in improving the welfare of agents.
2. We highlight the need to improve the economic micro-foundation and the econometric
identiﬁcation of the structural disturbances when bringing together estimated models
and optimal policy analysis. In particular, we show that efﬁcient labor supply shocks and
inefﬁcient wage markup shocks are close to observationally equivalent from an empirical
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supply shocks is indeed fully accommodated in the Ramsey allocation whereas the wage
markup shocks are fully allowed to pass-through wage and price dynamics.
3. The preceding point is crucial when looking for simple rules approximating the optimal
policy which are very sensitive to the structure of economic shocks.
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Stochastic Steady State Deviations (in percentage)
Output Consumption Investment Inﬂation Wage Inﬂation
Subsidies
Estimated
benchmark 3.50 2.13 20.97 -0.61 -0.61
¹ = 1:1 2.18 0.10 20.53 -0.38 -0.38
¹w = 1:3 3.76 2.48 21.16 -0.65 -0.65
RamseyIR
benchmark 5.42 4.52 23.34 0.02 0.02
¹ = 1:1 5.24 4.27 23.23 0.07 0.07
¹w = 1:3 5.96 5.22 23.89 0.02 0.02
No Subsidies
Estimated
benchmark 3.60 2.64 20.01 -0.62 -0.62
¹ = 1:1 2.17 0.26 20.07 -0.38 -0.38
¹w = 1:3 3.84 2.99 20.14 -0.66 -0.66
RamseyIR
benchmark 6.70 6.25 25 0.02 0.02
¹ = 1:1 5.82 4.99 24.07 0.07 0.07
¹w = 1:3 7.21 7 25.23 0.01 0.01
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Tab. 8: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS I
Welfare Welfare Std. dev. Std. dev. Std. dev.
Cost Level Output Inﬂation Wage Inﬂation
Subsidies
Estimated
benchmark 0 -173.35 5.26 0.97 1.11
¹ = 1:1 0 -176.09 5.11 0.96 1.09
¹w = 1:3 0 -173.90 5.04 0.94 1.04
RamseyIR
benchmark -2.14 -170.93 7.25 0.27 0.32
¹ = 1:1 -4.17 -171.37 7.31 0.26 0.34
¹w = 1:3 -2.50 -171.07 7.26 0.28 0.31
No Subsidies
Estimated
benchmark 0 -219.57 5.38 1.02 1.14
¹ = 1:1 0 -178.25 5.21 0.99 1.11
¹w = 1:3 0 -228.10 5.3 1 1.09
RamseyIR
benchmark -2.77 -215.07 8.15 0.28 0.40
¹ = 1:1 -4.11 -172.95 7.60 0.27 0.37
¹w = 1:3 -3.25 -222.83 8.11 0.9 0.35Fig. 3: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A TECHNOLOGY SHOCK.






























































Note: Ramsey (doted lines), estimated Rule (solid lines), density intervals covering 80% of the pos-
terior distribution (between the ﬁrst and last deciles).
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August 2007Fig. 4: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A PREFERENCE SHOCK.
























































Note: Ramsey (doted lines), estimated Rule (solid lines), density intervals covering 80% of the pos-
terior distribution (between the ﬁrst and last deciles).
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August 2007Fig. 5: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCK.



































































Note: Ramsey (doted lines), estimated Rule (solid lines), density intervals covering 80% of the pos-
terior distribution (between the ﬁrst and last deciles).
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August 2007Fig. 6: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO AN INVESTMENT SHOCK.

































































Note: Ramsey (doted lines), estimated Rule (solid lines), density intervals covering 80% of the pos-
terior distribution (between the ﬁrst and last deciles).
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August 2007Fig. 7: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A LABOUR SUPPLY SHOCK.

































































Note: Ramsey (doted lines), estimated Rule (solid lines), density intervals covering 80% of the pos-
terior distribution (between the ﬁrst and last deciles).
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August 2007Fig. 8: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A PRICE MARKUP SHOCK.
































































Note: Ramsey (doted lines), estimated Rule (solid lines), density intervals covering 80% of the pos-
terior distribution (between the ﬁrst and last deciles).
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August 2007Fig. 9: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO AN EXTERNAL FINANCE PREMIUM SHOCK.































































Note: Ramsey (doted lines), estimated Rule (solid lines), density intervals covering 80% of the pos-
terior distribution (between the ﬁrst and last deciles).
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August 2007Fig. 10: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A WAGE MARKUP SHOCK.

























































Note: Ramsey (doted lines), estimated Rule (solid lines), density intervals covering 80% of the pos-
terior distribution (between the ﬁrst and last deciles).
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August 2007Fig. 15: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A TECHNOLOGY SHOCK.














































Note: Ramsey (red lines), OWB (Blue lines), ORC (Green lines).
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August 2007Fig. 16: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A PREFERENCE SHOCK.
















































Note: Ramsey (red lines), OWB (Blue lines), ORC (Green lines).
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August 2007Fig. 17: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A PUBLIC EXPENDITURE SHOCK.
















































Note: Ramsey (red lines), OWB (Blue lines), ORC (Green lines).
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August 2007Fig. 18: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO AN INVESTMENT SHOCK.
















































Note: Ramsey (red lines), OWB (Blue lines), ORC (Green lines).
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August 2007Fig. 19: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A LABOUR SUPPLY SHOCK.














































Note: Ramsey (red lines), OWB (Blue lines), ORC (Green lines).
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August 2007Fig. 20: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A PRICE MARKUP SHOCK.
















































Note: Ramsey (red lines), OWB (Blue lines), ORC (Green lines).
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August 2007Fig. 21: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO AN EXTERNAL FINANCE RISK PREMIUM SHOCK.

















































Note: Ramsey (red lines), OWB (Blue lines), ORC (Green lines).
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August 2007Fig. 22: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A WAGE MARKUP SHOCK.

















































Note: Ramsey (red lines), OWB (Blue lines), ORC (Green lines).
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August 2007Fig. 23: COMPARISON OF RAMSEY, ORC AND OWB COUNTERFACTUALS
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